First, let’s look at section 40(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) reads:

40. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation
    (a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act;

This provision is very broadly worded, so it can capture as many circumstances as possible, including indirect misrepresentations – someone taking steps on your behalf.  Second, the penalty for a finding of misrepresentation is grave, as an applicant is deemed inadmissible to Canada and barred from applying for permanent residence for five years.

Given these serious consequences though, officers should employ a high standard of procedural fairness. The duty of fairness requires an officer to ask appropriate questions when they have concerns about the credibility, accuracy, or genuine nature of the information provided by an applicant, that otherwise would be sufficient, if believed.[1]             

A visa application must be considered in its totality and cannot be compartmentalized, particularly when making a finding of misrepresentation. Given the severe penalties, findings of misrepresentation must not be taken lightly and should only be made where there is clear and convincing evidence.[2]

Further, still an assessment of an application must be procedurally fair.  A procedural fairness letter (PFL) must be inadequate and mention for example, whom the Officer had spoken to, what specific information they had provided about themselves, their relationship to or knowledge of the Applicant and how their answers were inconsistent with the information previously provided by the Applicant. If there are verifications, there may be a basis to seek a copy of those notes.[3] In Bao, the Honourable Justice MacDonald, citing Ge, found that because the officer in that case had developed credibility concerns arising directly from the applicant’s PFL response, “the Officer should have raised those concerns directly with the Applicant.”

Finally, the assessment of the evidence must also be reasonable.  In Rong, the Honourable Justice Tremblay-Lamer found reasoning about automatically failing to contact the supporting employer references to be both perplexing and unreasonable. Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded that the Officer’s reason for failing to contact the representative of the company did not make sense, “given the goal of the fairness letter was to allow the applicant an opportunity to address certain concerns and documentation issued by the applicant’s stated employer was the strongest and perhaps only way to address those concerns.[4]

Similarly, in Chhetry, the Honourable Madame Justice Strickland noted:

The difficulty in this case is that neither the decision nor the record demonstrates that the Applicant’s response to the fairness letter, including the assessment of the supplementary evidence, was reasonably assessed.[5]

Furthermore, as stated by the Honourable Justice Diner in Toki, wherein a deciding officer disregarded evidence provided by the Applicant in favour of on-site verifications that had been conducted: “the consequences of deliberate misrepresentation are serious. Consequently, the evidence supporting such a finding must be clear and the Officer’s reasons must reflect this. This includes explaining why evidence which counters such a conclusion is, at minimum, acknowledged.”

Ultimately, officers must provide clear reasons for preferring certain evidence over evidence provided in response to a PFL. In this respect, as noted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Lemieux in Tahiru:

[…] cogent reasons must be provided for discounting evidence or giving little or no weight to tendered evidence, such conclusions must be reasonable and made taking into account all of the evidence before the decision maker.[6]

Here at Bellissimo Law Group PC we are pressing the government for change!

Why?

Forms and requests for information should be transparent and in plain language. Each year, we see many people facing misrepresentation allegations in study permit applications because they legitimately misunderstood a question on a temporary resident or permanent resident application form, usually relating to previous refusals. This is in part because certain questions are not easy to follow. For example, on study permit application form IMM 1294 (06-2019) E, the question at Box 2 (b) reads “Have you ever been refused a visa or permit, denied entry or ordered to leave Canada or any other country or territory?  Many clients miss the portion regarding “any other country or territory”. Instead of multiple questions presented as one, the questions should be divided and set out in plain language.  For example, we would suggest: Have you ever applied to Canada for any type of immigration application, including for a permanent or temporary residence (visit, study, work) visa or permit, and been refused? Have you ever applied to any country other than Canada for any type of immigration application, including for a permanent or temporary residence (visit, study, work) visa or permit, and been refused?

The forms become even more confusing for applicants who have applied for and were refused a study permit and then apply for permanent residence. At Box 6(d) of the permanent resident application form IMM 5669 (06-2019) E it asks if the individual has “been refused refugee status, an immigrant or permanent resident visa (including a Certificat de Sélection du Québec (CSQ) or application to the Provincial Nominee Program ) PNP) or visitor or temporary resident visa, to Canada or any other country or territory?”. The question introduces refugee matters. It also refers to visas only, and not permits.  An applicant that was refused a study or work permit may interpret the question at Box 6(d) as not applying to their circumstances because there is no mention of the word “permit”. The question at Box 6(d) additionally provides another example of asking multiple questions as one. This runs counter to the purposes of positioning applicants to be candid and reads more like a trap.  Again, this question could be broken down and simplified. This would strikingly require twelve separate questions to position Box 6(d) fairly. [7] Applicants must always be candid, but we must work towards facilitation and not penalization; otherwise, innocent errors are captured in the same group as fraudsters and violators.

The consequences that follow a misrepresentation finding are significant: a five-year ban from Canada and five-year bar from applying for permanent residence. When captured by a misrepresentation finding, many immigration applicants have to dramatically alter their life plans and potentially those of family members.  Few individuals can put their lives on hold for five years and/or still qualify five years later.

Finally, a decision of the Federal Court has recognized that aside from those trained in law; these questions are not as clear as legal wordsmiths believe they are.   In the decision of He v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 112, the Honourable Madam Justice Sadrehashemi held at paragraph 34:

[28] The Officer also noted that Ms. He had made previous Canadian temporary resident visa applications, including in 2015, where her application was approved. The Officer drew from this that Ms. He “therefore is familiar with the process, the statutory questions, as well as the need to answer all questions truthfully.” While it may be true that Ms. He would have been familiar with the process and is expected to understand that she has an obligation to answer all questions truthfully, the assertion that she would have been familiar with the “statutory questions” on the Work Permit Application is unreasonable. The question at issue is lengthy with multiple parts. It is unreasonable to expect that applicants would remember the details of the questions years later. [Emphasis Added]

 So, if you are subject of a misrepresentation finding to your case assessed to ensure whether a challenge to Federal Court may be required, contact us today.

Sources

The post My Application Was Refused for Misrepresentation but I Did Not Lie Now What? first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

Tennant involves a judicial review of an application for a Canadian citizenship certificate. The Applicant, a minor, was born in the USA and claimed to be a Canadian citizen by way of descent. Because his father had also become a Canadian by descent, in order for the Applicant to be issued evidence of Canadian citizenship the officer had to be satisfied that at the time of his father’s birth outside of Canada the Applicant’s paternal grandfather had been employed by the Government of Canada.[2] The officer refused the citizenship application as she was not satisfied that the grandfather had been a government employee at the relevant time. The Honourable Justice Ahmed of the Federal Court came to “the only logical conclusion”[3] based on the evidence and took the unusual step of making a declaration that the Applicant is a citizen of Canada. The Federal Court did not certify a serious question of general importance yet the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration proceeded to the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that the Federal Court had exceeded its jurisdiction.

For those who are unfamiliar with the Federal Court’s role in immigration, refugee and citizenship cases, when a person’s application for permanent residence or citizenship, for example, is refused by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the person believes the IRCC officer made a factual or legal error, they may ask the Federal Court to review the negative decision.[4] This process is referred to as judicial review and consists of two stages. At the first stage – the application for leave – the judge must determine whether there a serious issue to be tried. If the judge is of the view that such an issue exists, leave will be granted and the case will proceed to the second stage. At the second stage, the judge will review the officer’s decision and determine if the decision should stand or if some sort of relief is warranted. Under subsections 18(1) 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, a Federal Court judge may order a wide variety of remedies including a declaration. It is not unusual for the judge to ask a different immigration officer to make a decision on the permanent residence application, or whatever the application may be. Such an approach is generally understood by the judiciary to reflect the deference properly owed to the executive branch of government.

The Federal Court judge may also certify a serious question of general importance, which would allow one of the parties to commence an appeal before the Federal Court of Appeal.

Although Justice Ahmed’s judgment was exceptional in that it included a declaration, the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal decided to quash the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration’s appeal last month. The Honourable Justice Laskin (with Justice Webb in agreement), wrote that the Federal Court’s remedy constituted a type of substitution, which is an exceptional remedy provided when “there is only one reasonable outcome”.[5] The majority added, “this Court should not be taken either to endorse or to disapprove of the application judge’s approach.”[6]

In a dissenting opinion, the Honourable Justice Near wrote that the Federal Court of Appeal should have allowed the appeal as “it is not at all clear that the Federal Court’s factual declaration that the respondent is a Canadian citizen was the only reasonable determination of the matter.”[7]

The Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in Tennant is an interesting read that explains why declarations will likely continue to be the exception to the rule in successful Federal Court cases.

Sources

The post Judicial Review Case Highlights an Exceptional Remedy first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

Division 16 of Bill C-97 introduced many important amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). This post will highlight some of those IRPA amendments.

Note that this post is not intended to be a complete account of the IRPA amendments – and certainly not a replacement for personalized legal advice. You should speak with an immigration lawyer before making any decision about your immigration or refugee matters. Further, how the amendments will be implemented remains to be seen, and the amendments may be implemented in ways that are not obvious from the text of Bill C-97 alone.

People seeking immigration advice should also read up on how Bill C-97 changes the regulation of immigration consultants, which is not covered here.

1. New Ground of Ineligibility for Inland Refugee Claims

People seeking refugee protection after coming to Canada will no longer be able to make a refugee claim to the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) if they previously requested refugee protection from certain foreign countries.

Before C-97, asylum-seekers were already ineligible if they made a previous refugee claim inside Canada, or if they had successfully received protection abroad (among other grounds). Now, ineligibility has been extended to people who tried to claim abroad but never succeeded in those claims.

The rule only applies to foreign countries that have an information-sharing agreement/arrangement with Canada “to assist in the administration and enforcement of their immigration and citizenship laws”. Exactly what this means and which countries this covers remains to be tested. However, it certainly includes the USA, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand.

The rule is also limited to claims made after C-97 was introduced on 19 March 2019.

People found IRB-ineligible under this new rule will only be able to submit applications for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA). Unlike IRB proceedings, PRRA applications allow much less time to collect evidence, and had much lower rates of success. However, unlike most PRRA applications, a PRRA application by someone found IRB-ineligible under the new rule will be entitled to a hearing.

People affected by the rule are also barred from applying for a Temporary Resident Permit (not to be confused with a Visitor, Study, or Work visa/permit) during the processing of any PRRA application.

This expanded ineligibility rule is troubling. There are several situations why someone who genuinely needs protection might have claimed elsewhere but not succeeded in getting or maintaining protection:  

• Some countries will accept refugee claims, but delay processing of those claims indefinitely.
• Some countries do not recognize the same grounds for protection as Canada (ex. the USA does not protect survivors of state-endorsed domestic violence, whereas Canada does)
• A refugee may flee their country to seek protection, only to find their persecutors followed them to a second country.
• A refugee may flee their home country to make a claim, but return after it seems persecution has ended – only to realize there is still persecution and flee again (ex. where a promising new government eventually turns out just as bad as the oppressive one they replaced)

2. Federal Court proceedings will extend the time refused asylum-seekers are barred from making H&C, TRP, and PRRA applications

If a refused refugee claimant asks the Federal Court the review an IRB refusal, and the Federal Court does not rule in their favour, it will extend the time they are barred from making certain applications.

If someone makes a refugee claim to the IRB, and that claim is refused by a division of the IRB, they cannot make certain immigration applications until one year has passed from the last refusal. Previously, a refused refugee claimant could ask the Federal Court to review the IRB’s refusal without extending that one-year bar – even if the Court’s decided against the claimant. This has now changed. If the Federal Court rules against the claimant, or if the claimant withdraws/abandons their Federal Court proceedings, the bar will be renewed for one year from that moment.

Applications that fall under the one-year bar are as follows:

• An application for Permanent Residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
• An application for a Temporary Resident Permit
• An application for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment

Fortunately, the exceptions to the one-year bar have not changed. It will not apply to people who would be denied life-sustaining medical care if removed, or people whose removal would hurt a child’s best interests.

3. To pressure foreign governments into cooperating with removals from Canada, Temporary Residents can be targeted

If the Canadian government believes that the government of a foreign country is unreasonably refusing/delaying the issuance of travel documents to their citizens who are in Canada, the government now has an explicit power to stop accepting applications for Worker, Student, or Visitor status from citizens of that country in retaliation – and even suspend or terminate in-process applications.

This move appears designed to pressure foreign governments into providing the travel documents necessary to remove their citizens from Canada.

4. New listed immigration objective

IPRA now lists an additional 12^th objective for Canada’s immigration system: “to maintain, through the establishment of fair and efficient procedures, the integrity of the Canadian immigration system”. Interestingly, this has been a stated goal of Canada’s refugee protection system since 2003 in slightly different terms, but not a stated goal for immigration generally.

For more information on Refugee Claims, please click here.

The post Bill C-97, Division 16: Tightened Restrictions on Inland Refugee Claims first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

Courts can order that a detained person be brought before them, and require the authorities to justify any and all aspects of the detention. Courts have used this power, the writ of habeas corpus, since the 13^th century to check abuses of power and end arbitrary detentions.

Habeas corpus is a protected right under article 10(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 2(c)(iii) of the quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of Rights.  Thanks to the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial superior courts handle habeas corpus matters (May v. Ferndale, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809).

However, legislators can create alternative processes to review detentions. If the alternative processes are “as broad as or broader” in scope than habeas corpus, then the courts cannot order habeas corpus; the detainee is supposed to use the alternative process instead.

Mr. Chhina was detained while awaiting removal from Canada, as he had previously evaded the immigration authorities. He was held in a maximum-security prison and kept on lockdown. Mr. Chhina alleged that his detention was unlawful due to its length, uncertain duration, and inappropriate conditions. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided for a review of this detention at the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (“the Board”). The Board must review immigration detentions after 48 hours, then after 7 days, and then every 30 days If Board makes an unreasonable decision, the Federal Court can ask the Board to redetermine its decision.

The SCC ultimately held that this IRPA process was not as broad as habeas corpus proceedings when it comes to challenging the conditions and length of an immigration detention.

First, the SCC found the IRPA process had a different onus of proof. In habeas corpus proceedings, the government is responsible for proving the detention is lawful. In the IRPA process, the Board assumes the detention has been lawful, and the detainee is responsible for proving why it should end.

Second, the IRPA process has a much narrower scope. Habeas corpus vets whether the overall detention is consistent with the detainee’s rights. Among other things, it allows Mr. Chhina to challenge the conditions of his detention. In practice, the Board does not question the conditions of detention; it generally asks only whether there are new reasons to release the detainee. In turn, the Federal Court rarely vets the conditions, finitude, length, and other aspects of the detention in full; it generally only considers whether the Board’s decision was reasonable enough to be left alone, or whether the Board should have to revisit its decision.

Third, the IRPA process is not as timely. Provincial superior courts tend to schedule habeas corpus with priority. In the IRPA process, going through the Board and then the Federal Court typically takes a long time; the Federal Court generally takes 85 days to provide leave for a hearing, and rarely makes a final decision before 30 days pass and the Board has made a new decision – at which point, the Federal Court proceeding is moot. In practice, does not only delay relief from the Federal Court – it may make it inaccessible in many cases.

While habeas corpus has previously been ruled unavailable in the immigration context, the SCC held that habeas corpus was only off-limits in those cases because the detainees were not actually challenging the lawfulness of their detention, but rather the lawfulness of their removal from Canada. Unlike them, Mr. Chhina was genuinely challenging his detention conditions.

Justice Abella dissented from the majority of the SCC. While she agreed that the IRPA process fell short of habeas corpus proceedings in practice, she found that the IRPA could and should be interpreted to create a process as broad as habeas corpus. Justice Abella concluded that the proper remedy was not to make habeas corpus available to immigration detainees, but rather to improve the IRPA process so that met her interpretation of IRPA – by placing the onus on the Minister, and also allowing detainees to challenge any aspect of their detention. However, Justice Abella rejected the majority’s argument on timeliness, as she pointed out the Federal Court had the power to expedite its timelines where necessary.

The post Unlawful Immigration Detentions and Habeas Corpus: The Case of Tusif Ur Rehman Chhina first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

Mr. Babafunmi was a Nigerian citizen who had studied and worked in the USA for several years prior to being deported to Nigeria for criminality. He later travelled to Canada to make a refugee claim based on fears tied to his time in Nigeria. The claim was refused and so were applications for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, sponsorship by his spouse/common-law partner from within Canada and criminal rehabilitation.

Justice E. Susan Elliott began her analysis by rejecting the respondent’s argument that rehabilitation factors fall outside the scope of a judicial review of a H & C application, noting:

I agree that an H&C application is not at all the same as a rehabilitation application. Nonetheless, the Officer did engage in an analysis of the Applicant’s criminality and his rehabilitation determining that they were “significant negative factors” in the Officer’s assessment of the H&C application. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the Decision, including the criminality and rehabilitation findings, is justified, transparent and intelligible and that the outcome falls within the range of possible acceptable outcomes defensible on the facts and law in light of the record before the Officer.[2]

The Court held that when reviewing the H & C application of an individual who has prior criminality and has provided evidence of rehabilitation, the officer must balance both “the positive and negative factors” as well as “consider the likelihood of the Applicant re-offending”.[3] The Court relied on Lau v. Canada[4] as authority for the proposition that the likelihood of re-offending is the most important factor in an application for rehabilitation.[5]

Turning to the BIOC, Mr. Babafunmi submitted that several children would be directly affected by his removal to Nigeria. The officer had adopted the following position on two of these children – the Applicant’s Canadian godchildren:

“their best interests would not be significantly negatively impacted by the Applicant being returned to Nigeria and they could strive to maintain their close relationship by other means.”[6]

The Court found the officer had erred in the BIOC analysis by failing to consider the best interests of the Applicant’s godchildren going forward.[7] The officer, in Justice Elliot’s view had not followed the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kanthasamy[8] and Baker[9].

Those preparing or reviewing an H & C application can draw on the lessons and cases referred to in Babafunmi when preparing or reviewing an H & C application that may raise questions of the Applicant’s likelihood of reoffending or the best interests of a child who may be directly affected by the decision.

For more information please contact us.

(Sources)

The post Lessons from a Recent Federal Court Review of a Humanitarian and Compassionate Application first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

The appellant challenged the finding by the Canadian Human Rights Commission that as a person with “no immigration status, he was not lawfully present in Canada”.[2] As a result, the Commission had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) to consider Mr. Tan’s complaint.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Rennie, writing for the majority in Tan, began his decision by considering Forrest v. Canada (Attorney General),[3] a 2006 Federal Court of Appeal case which held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear complaints from individuals without immigration status. Forrest found that it was the role of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to determine a person’s status. In Tan, the majority also interpreted “lawfully present in Canada” and “status of an individual”, terms which appear in the CHRA.

Notably, the majority found that “Forrest FCA was wrongly decided and ought no longer to be followed”.[4] Justice Rennie also wrote that “inclusive references” in the CHRA “demonstrate an intention to extend the benefit of the legislation to as broad a group of persons as possible.”[5]

The correct approach, in the majority’s view, is for the Commission to first attempt to answer the question of whether or not the complainant is lawfully present on their own. If the Commission cannot draw its own conclusion on this point, it should seek the advice of the appropriate minister.[6] Justice Rennie cautions that the advice of the Minister – be it the Minister of Justice, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration or Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, or anyone else – is only one factor to consider amongst myriad “other relevant factors”.[7]

Mr. Tan’s entry into Canada was “lawful as it was authorized under the Extradition Act”, concluded the majority.[8] Furthermore, Mr. Tan was “lawfully present in Canada” when the alleged discrimination occurred and so the Commission ought to consider the complaint.[9]

The Tan decision does not apply to any individual without immigration status, however. The majority expressly distinguishes Mr. Tan’s case from that of an individual on immigration detention, or a person whose refugee claim or pre-removal risk assessment was rejected.[10] Justice Rennie writes that Mr. Tan is “required by Canadian law to remain in Canada for the duration of his sentence”, unlike individuals who “but for pending legal proceedings or administrative delay, would be removed from Canada.”[11]

(Sources)

The post The Federal Court of Appeal’s Recent Decision in Tan v. Canada (AG) first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

The post This Week’s Success Story: Inadmissibility Finding in Judicial Review Considered Unreasonable first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

The post This Week’s Success Story: Rehabilitation Reconsideration Approved for Entire Family! first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

1. false representation;
2. fraud; or
3. knowingly concealed material circumstances.

The procedure for revocation of citizenship has changed significantly following Hassouna, a 2017 case which challenged the administrative process of citizenship revocation introduced in 2014. Bill C-6, which received Royal Assent in June 2017, amended the Citizenship Act to require that the Minister must provide written notice (with the reasons and grounds for revocation) and allow the person 60 days to

“make written representations with respect to the matters set out in the notice, including any considerations respecting his or her personal circumstances – such as the best interests of a child directly affected – that warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case and whether the decision will render the person stateless”.

The person may also “request that the case be decided by the Minister” instead of by the Federal Court, which is the default decision maker. Should the Minister decide to proceed with the citizenship revocation process after reviewing the person’s written representations, an application must be filed in the Federal Court seeking a declaration “that the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed his or her citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances”. If the Court makes such a declaration, the citizenship (or renunciation of citizenship) is revoked.

It is important to note that depending on the facts of a case, the effect of the Court’s declaration (i.e. whether the person becomes a permanent resident or a foreign national) and the revocation process differ. For example, if the person is suspected of being inadmissible on grounds of security, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may also become a party to the Federal Court application and the person may face removal in the event that the Ministers succeed before the Court.

(Sources)

The post The Revocation of Citizenship first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.

Ms. Toussaint’s diabetes and hypertension led one of her doctors to declare in a 2010 affidavit that Ms. Toussaint would be at extremely high risk of suffering severe health consequences if she does not receive health care in a timely fashion. Despite the severity of her condition, Ms. Toussaint was found to be ineligible for the program because she was not a refugee or other protected person, victim of human trafficking or detained migrant.

A citizen of Grenada, Ms. Toussaint had initially been admitted to Canada with a temporary resident visa and had worked in Canada from 1999 to 2006 without status. She found herself unable to work due to her medical condition and pleaded with health care professionals for assistance. In September 2008, Ms. Toussaint applied for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. However, her application was not reviewed because she could not afford to pay the processing fee and was denied a fee waiver. She applied for IFHP coverage but her application was refused in July 2009.

In December 2013, Ms. Toussaint filed a petition with the UN Human Rights Committee. The Committee adopted the view on 24 July 2018 that Canada had violated her rights to life, to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without discrimination, recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Canada was obligated to provide Ms. Toussaint “with adequate compensation for the harm she suffered” from 2009 to 2013 and under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future, including reviewing its national legislation to ensure that irregular migrants have access to essential health care to prevent a reasonably foreseeable risk that can result in loss of life.

The road to some semblance of justice for Ms. Toussaint was certainly long. She had previously challenged the decision to deny her IFHP coverage in the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal without success. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal. In the domestic courts she argued that her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom to life, liberty and security of person and to non-discrimination had been violated. She alleged discrimination against her on the basis of disability and citizenship. Her application for judicial review was dismissed by the Federal Court, which interpreted Order-in-Council P.C. 157-11/848 – in force from 1957 to 2012 and the root of the IFHP eligibility criteria – in line with the Citizenship and Immigration Canada director’s decision to refuse her application. The Court found that the purpose of the IFHP is to provide temporary healthcare to legal migrants. Canada also provides IFHP coverage to some illegal migrants, such as victims of trafficking, who are often unwittingly illegal migrants. Canada feels responsible for such illegal migrants because of the fact that they have been exploited by unscrupulous human traffickers. Ms. Toussaint is neither a legal migrant nor is she unwittingly an illegal migrant. Although she entered this country legally, she chose to remain here illegally; there is nothing stopping her from returning to her country of origin. She has chosen her illegal status and, moreover, she has chosen to maintain it…

(Source)

The post UN Releases Decision on Access to Canada’s Interim Federal Health Plan for Undocumented Migrants first appeared on Bellissimo Law Group.